Joint Ownership of Computer Software Copyright: A Solution to the Work for Hire Dilemma by Jarett, Stacy L.
COMMENTS
JOINT OWNERSHIP OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
COPYRIGHT: A SOLUTION TO THE WORK FOR HIRE
DILEMMA
STACY L. JARETTt
The definition of an "employee" who prepares a work for hire
under the first subsection of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act") 1 is
one of the most contested issues in the copyright field today. A split
between the Second and Seventh Circuits and the Fifth, Ninth, and
District of Columbia Circuits prompted the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari on the D.C. Circuit case.' The Second 3 and Seventh4 Circuits
argue for an expansive definition of "employee" incorporating earlier
t B.A. 1987, J.D. Candidate 1990, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to
thank Mark H. Biddle for sparking my interest in computer law.
" The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), defines works made
for hire as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as
a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instruc-
tional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Section 201(b) discusses the ownership of works made for
hire:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.
Id. § 201(b).
2 On November 7, 1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
362 (1988).
1 See Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 551-52 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
' See Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
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copyright common law. The Fifth,5 Ninth,' and D.C.' Circuits main-
tain that Congress intended to change the definition of "work for hire"
and restrict the definition of an "employee" at least to traditional
agency principles.8 Although many scholars have addressed the subject,9
I See Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy
Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 329-31, 334-36 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280
(1988).
" See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1989).
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1492-94
(D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF AGENCY § 220 (1958). The definition of ser-
vant states:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance
of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an inde-
pendent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
Id.
8 See, e.g., Gallay, Authorship and Copyright of "Works Made for Hire": Bugs
in the Statutory System, 8 COLUM. J. ART & L. 573, 580 (1984) (arguing that com-
missioned works should be works for hire only if they are covered in the second section
of the work for hire definition in the Act); Hardy, An Economic Understanding of
Copyright Law's Work-Made-for-Hire Doctrine, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 181,
183 (1988) (arguing that work for hire status should be given to works when the com-
missioner is the better exploiter of the work); Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 862 (1987) (discussing the compromises
that led to the present work for hire provisions); O'Meara, "Works Made for Hire"
Under the Copyright Act of 1976-Two Interpretations, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 523,
537-39 (1982) (arguing that courts should give great protection to employers or com-
missioners of works for hire); Note, The Treatment of Computer Software Works Made
for Hire Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 579, 592-98 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Treatment of Computer Software] (discussing various ways for com-
puter software to be considered commissioned works of the type listed in the definition
of work for hire under the Copyright Act of 1976); Comment, The "Works Made for
Hire" Doctrine and the EmployeelIndependent Contractor Dichotomy: The Need for
Congressional Clarification, 10 COMM/ENT L.J. 591, 597 (1988) [hereinafter Coin-
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most discuss the effect of work for hire doctrine on artists or authors
and almost entirely ignore another copyrightable form: computer
software."0
Computers and the software needed to run them are an integral
part of American life. They are indispensable to businesses, 1 hospitals,
and transportation.' As computer use proliferates, disputes over the
ownership of commissioned software will certainly increase. Computer
software cases have recently appeared more frequently in the work for
hire area." Courts should therefore consider the needs of software de-
velopers and programmers when determining the definition of work for
hire.
ment, EmployeelIndependent Contractor Dichotomy] (calling for legislative amend-
ments to remedy the problems with the work for hire provisions in the Copyright Act
of 1976); Note, Computer Programs and Other Faculty Writings Under the Work-for-
Hire Doctrine: Who Owns the Intellectual's Property?, 1 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH-TECH. L.J. 141, 142 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Faculty Writings] (arguing that
the present work for hire doctrine is at odds with academic tradition of allowing faculty
to keep the copyright of their works and suggesting methods to protect faculty rights);
Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright
Act: Misinterpretaion and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Comment, Commissioned Works] (arguing that drastic legislative changes are neces-
sary to protect the rights of authors); Note, The Works Made For Hire Doctrine Under
the Copyright Act of 1976-A Misinterpretation: Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel,
Inc., 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 649, 652 (1986) [hereinafter Note, A Misinterpretation] (argu-
ing that Aldon undermines the congressional intent to protect independent contractors,
as shown by the provision of two definitions of works made for hire in the 1976 Copy-
right Act); Note, The Freelancer's Trap: Work for Hire Under the Copyright Act of
1976, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 1305, 1310-38 (1984) [hereinafter Note, The Freelancer's
Trap] (discussing work for hire doctrine from the legislative and common law
perspectives).
"0 Only two pieces have appeared in law reviews since 1980 on the subject of
computers and work for hire. See Note, Treatment of Computer Software, supra note
9; Note, Faculty Writings, supra note 9. Both articles are over three years old.
"i See Hafner, Is Your Computer Secure?, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 1, 1988, at 64, 65
("Every workday, U.S. computer networks transmit close to $1 trillion among financial
institutions, an amount equal to 25% of the gross national product.").
12 The 1988 estimated expenditures on computer systems and office machines are
approximately $62 billion, up from $58 billion in 1987. See id. at 66. Software sales
account for at least one-fourth of that total. For example, by 1992, software sales will
be approximately 22% of IBM's aggregate sales. See Guterl, IBM's Very Tough Guy,
Bus. MONTH, Feb. 1988, at 22, 25.
" See Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 949 (1986); Hudson v. Good Rush Messenger Serv., Inc., 2 Copy-
right L. Rep. (CCH) 26,089 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1987); Q-Co Indus. v. Hoffman, 625
F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); BPI Sys., Inc. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex.
1981); cf. American Directory Serv. Agency, v. Beam, No. 87-1653 (D.D.C. Mar. 28,
1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database) (concentrating on joint ownership of computer
software without addressing whether software was a work for hire); Whelan Assocs. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (ruling out,
in a case based primarily on copyrightability of discrete parts of software, the possibil-
ity of the disputed software as a work for hire), affd on other grounds, 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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In Part I, this Comment will discuss the process of programming
and the copyrightability of computer software. Part II will briefly re-
view the common and statutory law of works for hire before and after
the Act. Part III will discuss the concept of joint ownership of copy-
right. Finally, Part IV will apply the definitions of work for hire and
joint ownership to computer software. This analysis will demonstrate
that the Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits advance the preferable inter-
pretation of works made for hire and that courts should increase the
role of joint ownership of copyright to settle conflicts between program-
mers and commissioners of software.
I. COPYRIGHTABILITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Software is comprised of three main parts: the logical layout of the
program, usually contained in flow charts or diagrams; the source code
and object code;14 and the user materials, such as manuals. Although it
is well accepted that the source and object codes receive copyright pro-
tection as literary works,1 5 and assumed that the same is true for user
manuals,16 the copyrightability of the logical layout of the program,
often called the sequence, structure, and organization of the program, 7
is less certain. 8
In general, the organization of a program can take many forms.
Thus, the programmer selects, through a particular layout, one out of
many possible arrangements of the program. The Third Circuit recog-
nized that the author contributes a great deal of creativity in designing
the logical layout of a program when it said:
As the program structure is refined, the programmer
must make decisions about what data is needed, where along
14 The source code is the programming done in the specific computer language,
such as BASIC or COBOL. The object code is the computer-translated binary code
that the computer actually understands and uses to perform the functions. See Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1230-31 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
1 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
1 See Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 895 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
17 See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1224 n.1.
18 Compare Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1224-25 (holding that sequence, structure, and
organization of software are copyrightable expressions of an idea) with Plains Cotton
Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the organization of a specific program was not copyrightable) and
Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (N.D.
Tex. 1978) (holding that sequence, structure, and organization of software are
noncopyrightable ideas).
[Vol. 137:1251
WORK FOR HIRE DILEMMA
the program's operations the data should be introduced, how
the data should be inputted, and how it should be combined
with other data. The arrangement of the data is accom-
plished by means of data files . . . and is affected by the
details of the program's subroutines and modules, for differ-
ent arrangements of subroutines and modules may require
data in different forms. Once again, there are numerous
ways the programmer can solve the data-organization
problems she or he faces. Each solution may have particular
characteristics-efficiencies or inefficiencies, conveniences or
quirks-that differentiate it from other solutions and make
the overall program more or less desirable.19
Those who create these important facets of a computer program should
receive some form of copyright protection. Unfortunately, the Second
and Seventh Circuits' interpretation of work for hire could deny cre-
ators of flow charts any copyright protection.
II. THE DEFINITION OF WORKS MADE FOR HIRE BEFORE THE
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
A. The Definition Under the Copyright Act of 19092o
Congress derives its authority for copyright protection from the di-
rection in the copyright clause of the United States Constitution to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries . . .. , In the 1909 Act, Congress
extended copyright protection beyond the limits of traditional author-
ship to encourage others to foster artistic creation with a definition of
author "includ[ing] an employer in the case of works for hire."22
Once Congress broadened the definition of author to include em-
ployers, courts began to expand the definition of employer from its
traditional agency law meaning. In Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Win-
1" Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230. The Whelan opinion had its roots in an earlier
district court opinion, SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816
(M.D. Tenn. 1985), that discussed the creativity involved in developing the organiza-
tion of a program. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239.
20 The Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (the "1909
Act"), repealed by The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
21 U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
22 The Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075,
1088, repealed by The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat.
2541, 2544 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
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mill Publishing Corp.,2" the Second Circuit extended work for hire
protection to an employer dealing with an independent contractor when
the "work is produced at the instance and expense of [the] employer."24
The court further broadened the definition in Scherr v. Universal
Match Corp.25 with a "right to control" test:
The essential factor in determining whether an em-
ployee created his work of art within the scope of his em-
ployment as part of his employment duties is whether the
employer possessed the right to direct and to supervise the
manner in which the work was being performed. . . .Other
pertinent, but non-essential, considerations, are those indicat-
ing at whose insistence, expense, time and facilities the work
was created.26
While the Brattleboro court implied that the commissioner should and
actually did exercise this control to get copyright protection under work
for hire, 7 the Scherr court made it clear that the employer need not
contribute creatively to the work.28 The "right to control" test assumes
that copyright control would encourage patrons to solicit more works,
thus encouraging more artists to create. By allowing artists the oppor-
tunity to obtain contractually the copyright to the work, courts at-
tempted to balance the relationship between patron and artist.29
This theory, however, ignores the patron's greater bargaining
power. Because of the presumption against the "employee," artists
under the 1909 Act would automatically lose their rights to the work
unless they could force the patron to transfer those rights. Unknown
artists certainly would lack the economic power to compel a patron to
transfer the rights: a patron can always hire another artist, but an un-
23 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966).
24 Id. at 567-68.
25 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970).
26 Id. at 500-01.
27 See Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 567.
28 See Scherr, 417 F.2d at 500.
29 See Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 568. This was not a novel theory. See Yardley v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686
(1940). This case did not specifically use the work for hire theory, but it did state the
basis for the 1909 Act's common law work for hire doctrine:
If [an artist] is solicited by a patron to execute a commission for pay, the
presumption should be indulged that the patron desires to control the pub-
lication of copies and that the artist consents that he may, unless by the
terms of the contract, express or implicit, the artist has reserved the copy-
right to himself.
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known artist would not be able to find another patron as easily."0 Pro-
ponents of the 1909 Act theory often argued that the commission price
would include the value of these rights, making no difference to the
artist if she does not retain the rights."' The potential value of an unex-
posed artist's work is difficult to estimate, however, and it is even more
difficult for the artist to extract a high price from the patron. As a
result, artists in the 1909 Act work for hire situation would generally
sell their works for very little and lose all of the rights to them. " Al-
though the "right to control" test had the advantage of being relatively
simple and predictable to apply because of its objectivity, it created a
bargaining edge for patrons that allowed them to take advantage of
artists.33 In recognition of this inequity, the drafters of the 1976 Act
attempted to change the statutory definition of works made for hire. 4
30 See infra note 32.
31 See Scherr, 417 F.2d at 502 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (stating that "it is not
unreasonable to assume ... that the parties expected the purchaser to wind up owning
the work lock, stock, and copyright and that the artist set his price accordingly").
32 See, e.g., Definition of Work Made for Hire in the Copyright Act of 1976:
Hearing before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1982)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Robin Brickman, Graphic Artists Guild)
(telling of the financial problems she had because of her lack of bargaining power when
dealing with publishing companies, and explaining that one serious inequity is that
independent contractors, who get none of the benefits of regular employment, get the
disadvantages of regular employment by losing the copyright to works created for the
employer); id. at 5 (statement of June Roth, Pres. of the Am. Soc'y of Journalists and
Authors) ("We cannot survive with one-time payments for well-researched and well-
written articles that have future resale potential that is denied by the work for hire
coercion. Yet, many writers cannot refuse to sign or not accept work; it is an ultima-
tum."). But see id. at 49-50 (statement of E. Gabriel Perle, Vice Pres., Time, Inc.)
(stating that most publishers do not want all of these rights and the potential mistreat-
ment of poor artists actually does not take place).
These artists were arguing that, through work for hire contracts, publishers were
forcing artists to sign away the rights they presumptively owned. The situation is simi-
lar to the unequal bargaining power between the parties in the pre-Act situation.
Whether the patron's superior bargaining position is used to make the artist sign away
her rights or to keep her from contractually saving them, the effect is clear: artists
under economic pressure lose the rights to their works without being fully compensated.
See generally id. (containing statements from artists and publishers on the abuses in
and misperceptions of the application of the work made for hire doctrine).
" Even some publishers testifying in the work for hire hearings in 1982 admitted
that the situation under the 1909 Act gave the commissioners an unfair edge. See id. at
48 (statement of Townsend Hoopes, Pres. of Ass'n of Am. Publishers).
"I See id.; cf. 134 CONG. REC. S6736-37 (daily ed. May 19, 1987) (statement of
Sen. Cochran) ("When Congress enacted these provisions, it intended commissioned
works to be works made for hire only if the requirements of the clause (2) of this
definition were met. Congress further intended that 'employee' works make for hire,
which fall under clause (1) of the definition would be the product of the traditional
employer-employee relationship, in which the employee would give up authorship and
copyright rights in his or her creations in exchange for a regular salary and other
employment benefits.")
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B. Change and Compromise Under the 1976 Copyright Act
Preparation for a new copyright act began in the 1950s.35 The fact
that the Copyright Office took more than two decades to change the
1909 Copyright Act shows that the new Act was not to be a slight
revision, but a drastic transformation. 6 Much of the discussion during
the alteration period focused on works made for hire. First, the Copy-
right Office requested the report made in 1958 by Borge Varmer.
3 7
Based on this report and other input from concerned parties, a draft of
the new wording was released in 1961. This draft proposed that works
made for hire be "works created by an employee within the regular
scope of his employment.""8 By using the terms "regular scope of his
employment," the drafters attempted to limit work for hire to tradi-
tional employment relationships.3" They feared, however, that this defi-
nition would not indicate clearly enough the intended change from the
1909 Act definition. By 1963, they had refined the definition to "a
work prepared by an employee within the scope of the duties of his
employment, but not including a work made on special order or
commission. "40
Publishers and other types of commissioning employers protested
this definition. They claimed that the proposed Act, by precluding their
ability to retain copyright protection for commissioned works, would
also preclude their ability to create compilations and other sorts of com-
monly commissioned works."' As a result, the drafters ultimately com-
promised with the publishing groups and allowed certain categories of
commissioned works to be included in the definition of works for hire
in the 1976 Act.42 Thus, the drafters of the new Act intended only
'5 See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION 127 (Comm. Print 1960) (report by B. Varmer), reprinted in 1 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 717 (The Copyright Society of U.S.A. eds. 1963).
38 See Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 49-50 (statement of E. Gabriel Perle,
Vice Pres. of Time, Inc.).
37 See supra note 35.
1s REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87TH CONG., 1ST SEss. 87, 88 (Comm. Print 1961),
quoted in LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 119 (W. Patry 6th ed. 1986) [hereinafter
LATMAN].
'9 See LATMAN, supra note 38, at 119.
40 Id.
41 See Senate Hearing, supra note 32, at 49 (statement of Townsend Hoopes,
Pres. of Ass'n of Am. Publishers).
42 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5736 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] ("The work-
made-for-hire provisions of this bill represent a carefully balanced compromise
. ... "); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (providing a definition of "work made for
hire").
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certain commissioned works to be works for hire, and then only if the
parties executed a written instrument conferring work for hire status on
a creation. 3 The first part of the definition, "a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment,""" seems, by com-
parison with earlier drafts of the definition and the reference to agency
law, limited to the traditional employment relationship.45 Even repre-
sentatives of the publishers conceded this to be the proper interpreta-
tion.46 Unfortunately, the Second and Seventh Circuits interpret this
definition with little attention to these statements, instead incorporating
into the definition a modified version of the common law regarding
works for hire under the 1909 Act.
C. Cases Construing the 1976 Act
The major appellate cases regarding work for hire take two paths.
The Second and Seventh Circuits interpret the first section of the work
for hire status provision with a broad view of employment resembling
the 1909 Act definition. These courts expand traditional notions of em-
ployment by applying the "actual control" test to employment relation-
ships. This test looks to see if the commissioner exercised any control
over the creation of the work. If she did, she is an employer and retains
"' See supra note 34. Senator Cochran has repeatedly attempted to make the defi-
nition even less ambiguous by introducing amendments to the work for hire sections of
the statute, but these amendments have not been sucessful. See S. 1223, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987); S. 2330, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. 2138, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); S. 2044, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). His most recent attempt has not yet come
out of committee, but, during the Berne Convention discussions, Senator DeConcini
promised that it would be considered next year. See 134 CONG. REC. S14,560-61 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cochran).
" 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
" See supra note 8.
" See LATMAN, supra note 38, at 120 n.28 (reporting that the publishers ac-
knowledged that the first subdivision in the definition of work for hire included only
salaried employees). Most other commentators agree with this interpretation. See, e.g.,
Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment-What Congress Really Intended,
35 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 210, 210-11 (1988) (arguing that several courts have inter-
preted the 1976 Act's definition of works made for hire as limiting the meaning of"employment" to "formal employment," which "suggest[s] that Congress intended the
'on special order or commission provision' to be the exclusive for-hire mechanism for
independent contractors"); Comment, Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy,
supra note 9, at 607 ("The legislative history of the 1976 Act seems to indicate that
Congress was intent on protecting the rights of independent contractors."); Comment,
Commissioned Works, supra note 9, at 1294 ("Because there was no explicit incorpora-
tion of prior case law concerning works made for hire, the 1976 Act provided the basis
for completely new judicial treatment of commissioned works made for hire."); cf. Note,
A Misinterpretation, supra note 9, at 651 ("The New Act therefore, has sharply dis-
tinguished between employee works prepared within the scope of employment and
works prepared by an independent contractor.").
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the copyright because it is a work for hire. This vision of employment
raises two problems. First, it substantially reduces the predictability of
copyright ownership because of the subjectivity of any test determining
creativity. Second, it requires a great deal of understanding of the field
in which the creation takes place in order to determine the amount of
the commissioner's creative contribution. This determination, quite pos-
sibly based on an incorrect understanding of a complex trade such as
computer programming, could result in the loss of all of the contractor's
rights to the work.
The Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits take a literal view of the
work for hire provisions. This interpretation limits the employment re-
lationship discussed in the first subsection of the work for hire defini-
tion to traditional employment, so that a commissioned work can be a
work for hire only if it falls into subsection two. This approach pro-
vides predictability of copyright ownership, because the test does not
depend on the court's subjective evaluation of creativity, and an inde-
pendent contractor cannot lose copyright ownership unless she agrees in
writing.
1. The Commissioner's Side
In Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,47 Ginsberg, a principal
of the Aldon corporation, decided to produce a line of figures depicting
mythological creatures. Ginsberg described his idea for the statuettes to
Wado, a Japanese manufacturing company, and Unibright, a
Taiwanese firm. Wado and Unibright ultimately manufactured the
porcelain and brass figurines, respectively, with Ginsberg supervising
the artists.48 The court stated that "[t]he gist of [Ginsberg's] testimony
was that while he is not an artist and did not do the sketching or
sculpting, he actively supervised and directed the work step by step." '49
Ginsberg registered the copyright for the statuettes in Aldon's name as
a "work made for hire."50
In mid-1981, Aldon realized that Spiegel was selling brass uni-
corns identical to Aldon's and sued for copyright infringement.51 The
court of appeals held that Aldon owned the copyright to the statuettes
47 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
48 See Aldon, 738 F.2d at 549-50.
49 Id. at 550. In their article criticizing the Aldon decision, however, Spiegel's
attorneys suggested that Ginsberg's role in creating the statues was not very great. See
FitzGibbon & Kendall, The Unicorn in the Courtroom: The Concept of "Supervising
and Directing" an Artistic Creation Is a Mythical Beast in the Copyright Law, J.
ARTS MGMT. & L., Fall 1985, at 23, 27-29.
50 See Aldon, 738 F.2d at 550.
51 See id.
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because the Taiwanese company's artists were "supervised and di-
rected" by Ginsberg, who was, "in a very real sense, the artistic crea-
tor."5 2 Because of Aldon's standing as copyright owner, Aldon could
sue Spiegel for infringement. The court then upheld the jury's verdict
that Spiegel infringed Aldon's copyright.5
The Aldon court mentioned little of the legislative history showing
Congress's intent to restrict the first section of the statutory definition
to traditional employer-employee relationships. Instead, the court said,
"Nothing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicates that Con-
gress intended to dispense with this prior law applying the concepts of
'employee' and 'scope of employment.' ,54 Citing Professor Nimmer,
the court continued, "The new Act does not define these key terms,
thus suggesting that it is necessary to look at the general law of agency
as applied by prior copyright cases in applying subdivision (1) under
the new Act."
'55
The court found the indications of change in the Act's legislative
history relevant only to the addition of the second section of the work
for hire definition. Congress therefore did not intend to erase entirely
the influence of the "right to control test" under the 1909 Act.56 The
court pointed out that, under the 1909 Act, all works created by an
independent contractor were presumed to belong to the hiring party
"regardless of the presence or absence of direction and supervision by
52 Id. at 553.
" See id. at 554. The court achieved a just solution as applied to Aldon and
Spiegel; Spiegel had stolen the works from Aldon. Denying the Japanese company par-
ticipation in the copyrights to these statuettes, however, was unfair and unnecessary.
See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552.
Id. (citing 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][1] at 5-12 to -13
(1983)); see also 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][1][a] at 5-12 to -
14 (4th ed. 1987) (discussing who is an employee). As pointed out in Easter Seal Soci-
ety for Crippled Children & Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises., 815
F.2d 323, 330-31 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988), however, Pro-
fessor Nimmer does not interpret the 1909 Act case law in the way that the Aldon
court said he did. Professor Nimmer saw a distinction between traditional employees
and independent contractors even under the 1909 Act. Therefore, when he said that
common law construing the 1909 Act should be applied, he meant the common law
defining an employee as a traditional employee under agency principles. See id. at 330
n.13. Compare 1 M. NIMMER, supra, at 5-12 to -13 (stating that the right to control
test under the 1909 Act is the same as that for an agency relationship) with id. at 5-21
to -22 & n.60 (stating that, under the 1976 Act, commissioning parties generally have
fewer rights than under the 1909 Act).
51 "Had Congress intended . . . to narrow the type of employment relationships
within the work for hire doctrine to include only 'regular' employees, it is unlikely that
there would have been no discussion of this change in the legislative history." Aldon,
738 F.2d at 552. But, as set forth earlier, Congress did, in fact, intend to narrow the
types of relationships within the doctrine. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying
text.
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the hiring party."5 The court attributed the limited changes indicated
in the Act's legislative history to Congress's recognition of this injus-
tice.58 Thus, Congress only intended to change the work for hire defini-
tion by adding the second section preserving rights for independent con-
tractors who performed all of the creative work. 9 The Second Circuit's
interpretation of the Act therefore treats those contractors who contrib-
ute less than the entire creative force to a work as employees under
subsection one of the Act.6 0
The Second Circuit's myopic analysis of the Act's legislative his-
tory places independent contractors in a precarious position. Under its
view, contractors must guess whether a court will find that a commis-
sioner has "sufficiently supervised" production of a work before ascer-
taining copyright ownership. In fields such as computer law in which
even "sufficient supervision" may not supersede the contractor's crea-
tive effort, the Aldon decision will nonetheless turn independent con-
tractors into "employees," causing them to lose all their rights of copy-
right ownership while simultaneously denying them the benefits of
traditional employment. This situation gives commissioners great incen-
tive to hire contractors, but it does not deal fairly with the contractors.
If the commissioner's contribution to the creation of the work were suf-
ficient to consider the work made for hire under Aldon, then the par-
ties should own the work jointly."1 The Aldon decision expands the
scope of the work for hire doctrine from the Act's prescribed situations
of works created either 1) in traditional employment situations or 2) as
commissioned works in one of the nine categories with written permis-
sion of the contractor, to any situation in which a commissioner has
supervised creation of the work. This expansion nullifies the effect of
the Act's limitations and defeats Congress's intent as expressed in the
legislative history to the Act. 2
The inequity of the Aldon "actual control" test became more ap-
parent when the Seventh Circuit applied it in the case of Evans
Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software.63 Chicago Systems was rec-
ommended to Evans Newton as a reliable programming contractor.6
The president of Evans Newton prepared the bid guidelines and cre-
ated the flow charts for new programs, which later became the basis of




81 See infra notes 113-41 and accompanying text.
82 See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
63 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
84 See id. at 891.
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an informal agreement between the parties stipulating that Chicago
Systems would provide the programming and documentation for a set
fee. After the programming began, Evans Newton sent Chicago Sys-
tems a letter stating that "'[t]he ENI [Evans Newton Inc.] Copyright
of this program is fully recognized by Chicago Software Systems
[sic].' " Although Chicago Systems never responded to this letter, its
president signed a statement embodying the letter's terms after the pro-
gramming was substantially completed.6 Evans Newton then regis-
tered the program user's manual for copyright as a work made for
hire.67 However, it failed to prove that the computer program itself was
registered. 8
In 1980, Chicago Systems began to market a program very similar
to the one it created with Evans Newton.69 Chicago Systems sold two
copies for $1,200 apiece and two demonstration disks for less than
$200."0 Evans Newton sued Chicago Systems for copyright infringe-
ment, asking for damages and an injunction. 1 The district and appel-
late courts specifically approved the Aldon decision and held that Chi-
cago Systems had infringed the copyright on the manual. 2 Although
the district court found no evidence that Evans Newton had "suffi-
ciently supervised" the actions of Chicago Systems, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court finding that Evans Newton "actually con-
trolled" Chicago Systems.7 By giving the copyright to the programs
entirely to Evans Newton, which developed only the flow charts, the
11 Id. at 892 (quoting Letter from Lloyd Ferguson, president of Evans Newton, to
Brian Brazda, president of Chicago Systems (Aug. 6, 1979)).
88 See id. at 892 & n.3.
e See id. at 892.
88 See id. at 895 n.6.
6 See id. at 892.
70 See id.
71 See id. at 891.
712 See id. at 894. The district court dismissed the infringement claim on the
software because Evans Newton had not proved registration of it. See id. at 895 n.6.
Therefore, the suit involved only infringement of the user's manual.
" See id. at 894. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of ac-
tual control despite evidence in the record stating that payment was a set fee based on
an estimated work time and Evans Newton contributed no programming skills. See id.
at 891. As the Fifth Circuit stated:
[T]he "actual control" test . . . can gradually slide into a "right to con-
trol" test, just as in the old "work for hire" doctrine the "right to control"
test from agency law gradually slid into an almost absolute (though fre-
quently false) presumption that whoever paid for creation of the work had
the "right" to control its production. This is not mere pessimistic specula-
tion on our part; we see evidence of this trend already in Evans Newton
Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software. . ..
Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815
F.2d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).
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court discounted the creative effort expended in programming.
A detailed understanding of the normal trade practices of the field
is necessary in order to determine actual control in many of these situa-
tions. 4 If the court incorrectly decides that the commissioner contrib-
uted creatively to the work or minimizes the creative input by the con-
tractor, the work will be considered a work for hire and the contractor
will retain no copyright to the work. Furthermore, this decision will be
made after the work has been created and the parties have contracted
for compensation. Therefore, it will be very difficult for the contractor
to protect herself monetarily from a potential loss of copyright. The
court's apparent misunderstanding of programming and software copy-
right doctrine caused Chicago Systems to lose all copyright benefits
from a work for which they expended a great deal of creative effort.
The injustice of the Aldon test is clear here.
The Second and Seventh Circuits align themselves with patrons in
the debate over how to further the aims of the copyright clause in the
Constitution. Furthermore, they place independent contractors in the
uncertain position of relying on a court's evaluation of the creative con-
tribution by commissioners necessary to determine whether the inde-
"' While this understanding is also somewhat necessary in the joint ownership
determination, making an uninformed determination in the work for hire context can
result in greater injustices. See supra notes 47-73 and accompanying text. First, the
artist loses all copyright to the work made for hire instead of sharing it. Second, the
decision to make a work a work for hire under the Aldon interpretation can be totally
unexpected by the artist; under joint ownership, the parties must have some sort of
intent to create a joint work, thus adding certainty to the transaction. See infra notes
113-16 and accompanying text.
An interesting facet of Evans Newton indicates a possible secondary motivation
behind the court's holding. The district court awarded Evans Newton $16,000 in dam-
ages and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. However, Chicago Systems only made a total of
$1,400 worth of sales for the program and the manual combined. The court said that
Evans Newton
presented sufficient evidence of market penetration, dollar volume, and
franchise and dealer fees which indicated that the $16,000 award was jus-
tified, if not overly conservative. ENI [Evans Newton Inc.] points out that
the mere fact that CSS [Chicago Systems Software] was not able to capi-
talize as it had hoped on its infringement does not prevent the district
court from compensating ENI for losses sustained in excess of CSS's
profit.
Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 896 (footnote omitted). It seems remarkable that the sale of
two copies of a manual could be responsible for $16,000 of economic harm to Evans
Newton. It is possible that the court chose this road to distributing ownership rights to
compensate Evans Newton for what it felt to be infringement of the programs as well.
See id. The fact that, in determining infringement, the district court did not actually
determine the similarity of the manuals, but made its finding primarily upon the simi-
larity of the computer programs, supports this theory. See id. at 893 & n.4. The Sev-
enth Circuit allowed this finding by saying that "the two components had no significant
value independent of one another," implying that substantial similarity of the programs
would mean substantial similarity of the manuals as well. Id. at 895.
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pendent contractors will lose the rights to their works. Thus, while en-
couraging patrons to sponsor artists, these circuits have decreased the
incentive for artists to create.
2. Help for Independent Contractors
After the Seventh Circuit approved the Aldon doctrine, it seemed
that the Second Circuit work for hire doctrine would receive general
acceptance among the courts.7 5 However, the Fifth Circuit set its own
course in the work for hire field when it decided Easter Seal Society for
Crippled Children & Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy
Enterprises.6
In this case, an entertainer acting on behalf of the Easter Seal
Society collaborated with the New Orleans public television station,
WYES, to stage a "Mardi-Gras style" parade.7 No mention of copy-
rights was made during the collaboration.' The entertainer was the
"master of ceremonies" and gave a few suggestions to the crew at
WYES, but WYES was primarily responsible for the production and
direction of the segment.79 WYES kept a copy of the video footage and
used this footage in several other productions."0 One producer request-
ing the tape then spliced it into an "adult" film. This film was shown
nationally four times. Some viewers recognized themselves in the film
and prompted the Easter Seal Society to sue, among others, WYES and
Playboy, one of the film's distributors, for copyright infringement."'
The Fifth Circuit found that the first section of the work for hire
definition should apply only to traditional employees. The court said
that "[c]ourts must use common sense and consider the sort of factors
set out in the Restatement to determine whether a given seller is an
employee. 'Actual control' . . . [is] relevant, but alone [it] cannot make
an otherwise independent contractor into an employee." 82 The court
gave four reasons to support its use of this test:
First . . . this interpretation makes sense out of the nine
narrow categories in § 101(2): they are statutory permission
7 This was despite substantial academic criticism. By 1987, most academic writ-
ings discussing Aldon had criticized the decision and advocated a more literal interpre-
tation of the work for hire definition. See supra note 9.
76 815 F.2d. 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).




81 See id. at 325.
82 Id. at 335-36 (citation omitted); see also supra note 8 (quoting the traditional
definition of "servant" given in the RESTATEMENT (AGENCY)).
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to allow certain kinds of independent contractors to sign
away their authorship to their buyers. Second, this interpre-
tation ties the meaning of "work for hire" to a well-devel-
oped doctrine in agency law. . . . Third, this approach gives
buyers and sellers the greatest predictability. . . . Finally,
adopting an agency-law definition of copyright "employ-
ment" creates a certain moral symmetry: a buyer is a statu-
tory "author" if and only if he is responsible for the negli-
gent acts of the seller.83
Another important part of the Easter Seal opinion introduces joint
ownership into the work for hire discussion. Although the court did not
decide the issue overtly,84 it pointed out that the "actual control" situa-
tions that prompted the Aldon court to give work for hire status to a
work are probably situations in which joint ownership would be appro-
priate because of contributions by both parties.8 5
The Easter Seal solution is optimal because it protects the rights
of artists while still giving commissioners an economic incentive to
sponsor artists. A contractor can create a work for hire only if it falls
into one of the nine statutory categories and the contractor signs a writ-
ten agreement. The nontraditional employee-artist, therefore, cannot
lose the copyright to a work when a court later determines that it was
created with sufficient supervision by the commissioner. Even if the
work lies outside of the statutory categories, however, the commissioner
can still obtain the copyright to the work through a transfer of copy-
right. This transfer requires the author's permission and gives her the
right to terminate the transfer after 35 years.86 Thus, the Easter Seal
decision strikes a balance between encouraging patrons to sponsor crea-
tivity and reimbursing artists for their creative work.
The Supreme Court will resolve the work for hire issue in Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV). 7 CCNV developed
the idea for a statue of a homeless family huddling over a grate with
steam coming out of it. It commissioned James Earl Reid to create this
statue.88 During the design stage, CCNV vetoed a few of the poses he
had suggested, and it specified that he use a light material for casting
83 Id. at 335.
" Neither party argued that joint ownership was an option in this case. See id. at
337.
s See id. at 333, 337.
86 See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
87 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
88 See id. at 1487.
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the statue.8" Reid, however, picked the models and did all of the sculpt-
ing himself.9" CCNV compensated Reid only for the cost of the materi-
als; he donated his services. 9 '
After CCNV sent the statue back to Reid for some repairs, it de-
cided to take the sculpture on tour to raise money. Reid opposed the
tour because he felt the statue was too fragile to withstand traveling.92
He wanted to recast the statue in a more durable material or make a
mold of the statue, but CCNV would not reimburse his expenses. Reid
refused to return the statue to CCNV, filed for the copyright to the
statue, and planned to take the sculpture on a shorter tour.9" CCNV's
agent and trustee filed a competing copyright registration certificate in
his name.94 CCNV then sued Reid for return of the sculpture and de-
claratory judgment of ownership of the sculpture's copyright.9"
The district court followed Aldon and found that, because CCNV
had sufficiently supervised Reid's work, the sculpture was a work for
hire.9" The court found that CCNV performed the creative role in the
development of the statue97 and therefore should have the copyright to
it.98 The District of Columbia Circuit overturned this holding, how-
ever, in favor of the literal interpretation espoused by the Fifth Circuit
and "the almost unanimous support [of academic] commentary."9
The court's examination of the work for hire definition closely fol-
lowed the path taken by the Fifth Circuit. The court held succinctly
89 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4 n.2, 6 n.5, Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362
(1988).
90 See CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1487-88. As Reid said, "'Nobody can dictate what I do
with my work. My spirit and heart and creativity come from me and from above. It's
an opportunity for me to play God, really. It's a life force.'" Epstein, Court to Say
Who Owns Rights to "Homeless" Sculpture, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 28, 1988, at
El, col. 1, El, col. 1.
91 See CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1487.




98 See id. at 1491, 1493.
9' Apparently, the district court felt that sculpting requires little creativity if
someone else helps develop the sculpture design.
" See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1456-
57 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362
(1988).
19 CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1492; see also id. at 1492-93 (citing A. LATMAN, R.
GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2d ed. 1985)); LATMAN, supra note 38; Litman, supra note 9; Comment, Employeel
Independent Contractor Dichotomy, supra note 9; Note, The Freelancer's Trap,
supra note 9).
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that Reid was an independent contractor,' 00 that "sculpture surely is
not a category of commissioned work enumerated in § 101(2), and no
written agreement existed between CCNV and Reid."'' The court
then pointed to the option of joint ownership as possibly appropriate in
this situation.0 2 Because the court found the record insufficient to
make such a determination, however, it remanded the case for further
factual consideration and development of the "joint work" argument.0 3
In January, the Ninth Circuit essentially sided with the Fifth and
D.C. Circuits in Dumas v. Gommerman.104 The case involved an artist
whose works were commissioned through a gallery for a corporation.' 5
When the artist died, the gallery began to make posters using the com-
misioned works.'06 The artist's wife sued for a declaratory judgment
regarding copyright ownership and damages, and she won107 The
Ninth Circuit reviewed in depth the statutory history of the Act and
came to the conclusion that only "formal, salaried employees" are cov-
ered by section 101(1) of the Act.x0 ' The court went on to say that it
thought the Easter Seal test that allowed consideration of the "actual
control" factor could lead to results similar to Aldon.'09 The Ninth
Circuit then proposed its own test, which is similar to the agency fac-
tors."' By using this test, the court felt that it was restricting the em-
ployee definition further than the Fifth Circuit."' In application, how-
ever, the two tests will probably yield the same results." 2 Therefore,
100 See id. at 1494. The court did not spend much time on this issue. In fact, the
court disposed of it in a footnote:
Reid, a fine artist, donated his services, worked in his own studio, and
personally engaged assistants when he needed them. Creating sculptures
was hardly "regular business" for CONV. Given these matters of fact, see
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1958), we think it evident that
Reid was not CCNV's employee ....
Id. at 1494 n.l1.
101 Id. at 1494.
102 See id. at 1497. "In sum, were it not for the prevailing confusion over the
work for hire doctrine, this case . . . might qualify as a textbook example of a jointly-
authored work in which the joint authors co-own the copyright." Id. (footnote omitted).
CCNV actually offered joint ownership to Reid before the suit began. See Sculptor and
Patron Clash Over Piece, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1989, at A18, col. 1, A18, col. 2.
'0" See CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1496 & n.14.
104 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
10I See id. at 1094.
108 See id. at 1095.
107 See id.
10' See id. at 1102.
109 See id. at 1104.
110 See id. at 1105; see also supra note 8 (providing the RESTATEMENT (AGENCY)
definition of "servant").
111 See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105.
112 The Ninth Circuit stated that the Fifth Circuit did not limit its definition of
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for purposes of this Comment, their holdings will be treated as the
same.
Using either the Aldon or Easter Seal approach, works created in
traditional employment relationships become works for hire under sub-
section one of the Act, and works within the nine statutory categories
are works for hire with the contractor's permission. In between lies a
grey area containing works created by both the commissioner and the
contractor. In order to encourage patronage of creative activities, the
Aldon court solved the problem of ownership in such cases by giving
the copyright to the commissioner. The Easter Seal, Dumas, and
CCNV courts recognized, however, that contractors need incentive to
create as well. Denying contractors copyright ownership without notice
will not perform this function; therefore, joint ownership offers the best
solution for cases falling within the grey area.
II. JOINT OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHT
A. Statutory Definitions
The main elements of joint ownership of copyright include the in-
tent to create a joint work, the nature of the contribution by each crea-
tor, and the proprietary interests shared among joint authors. Section
101 of the Act defines a joint work as "a work prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."" 3 This defini-
tion emphasizes the first two features of joint works: the authors must
intend that the work be a joint work, and the contributions must be
inseparable or interdependent. Section 201(a) provides that "[t]he au-
thors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work.""' 4
The House Report on the Act notes that the requisite intent exists
"if the authors collaborated with each other, or if each of the authors
prepared his or her contribution with the knowledge and intention that
it would be merged with the contributions of other authors as 'insepa-
rable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.' 1115 Thus, the inten-
employee to formal, salaried employees because of its consideration of actual control.
See id. at 1104. The Fifth Circuit asserted, however, that "'[alctual control'. . . alone
cannot make an otherwise independent contractor into an employee." See Easter Seal,
815 F.2d at 336-37. The difference, then, between the two tests is probably largely
semantic. The Ninth Circuit itself acknowledged the subtle difference between the two
tests. See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1104 ("We are in essential agreement with [the Fifth
Circuit's] interpretation").
113 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
114 Id. § 201(a).
"a HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
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tion does not have to be to create a specific joint work with a specific
artist, but to create part of what will definitely become a joint work."'
The House Report gives examples of inseparable and interdepen-
dent joint works. Novels or paintings are "inseparable" works.11 7 "In-
terdependent" works include "a motion picture, opera, or the words
and music of a song." '18 As Professor Nimmer points out, the differ-
ences between the two types of joint works are comparable to the differ-
ences between derivative and collective works." 9
The drafters, however, did not intend that all "interdependent" or
"inseparable" works become joint works. If the authors of the interde-
pendent work did not have the requisite intent to create a joint work,
the work will most likely become a collective work. 20 Therefore, the
difference between a collective work and an interdependent joint work,
and, in the same way, a derivative work and an inseparable joint work,
depends on the authors' intent at the time of creation.
& ADMIN. NEws at 5736.
,18 The legislators' definition of intent reflects judicial treatment of intent in cases
decided before the Act. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161
F.2d 406, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1946) (the "Melancholy Baby Case") (stating that the intent
to compose a joint work does not have to be to compose a specific work with a specific
coauthor), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944) ("[I]t makes no difference whether
the authors work in concert, or even whether they know each other; it is enough that
they mean their contributions to be complementary in the sense that they are to be
embodied in a single work to be performed as such.").
11I See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5736.
118 Id.
119 See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 55, § 6.04, at 6-11. Professor Nimmer further
contends that this difference is insignificant in the United States:
Does it make any difference whether a joint work results from inseparable
rather than from interdependent parts? For domestic purposes the distinc-
tion is apparently without significance. For foreign purposes, however,
there is some greater significance since under most foreign law a joint
work results only from a merger of inseparable, but not interdependent
parts.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
12I See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5736. The Report makes this idea clear when it says:
The definition of "joint works" has prompted some concern lest it be
construed as converting the authors of previously written works, such as
plays, novels, and music, into coauthors of a motion picture in which their
work is incorporated. It is true that a motion picture would normally be a
joint rather than a collective work with respect to those authors who actu-
ally work on the film. . . . On the other hand, although a novelist, play-
wright, or songwriter may write a work with the hope or expectation that
it will be used in a motion picture, this is clearly a case of separate or
independent authorship rather than one where the basic intention behind
the writing of the work was for motion picture use.
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Courts have not articulated a specific test for determining the level
of contribution by the parties necessary for the work to be considered
jointly created; courts have held, however, that the parties' contribu-
tions do not have to be quantitatively or qualitatively the same for them
to be joint authors. 21
While coowners could possess a copyright in many ways, the
House Report makes it clear that the authors and/or owners are to be
tenants in common. Furthermore, any owner of a joint work may li-
cense the work without permission of the other owners, as long as she
gives the proportional amount of any profits to the other owners.
1 22
B. The Practical Difficulties of Joint Ownership
A discussion of joint ownership merits a brief look at potential
practical difficulties which may be encountered in applying this concept
to commissioned works. Although problems exist, none is serious
enough to prevent joint ownership from becoming a solution in appro-
priate disputes.
1. The duty to account
The duty to account seems straightforward at first glance, but be-
comes more complicated when one part of the original joint work is
used independently for other purposes. For example, if two composers
collaborate on a song, one composing the music and the other writing
121 See Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921). In this case, one of the
authors of an operetta, who contributed the story line and a basic outline of the scenes
while the other authors wrote the dialogue and music, was nevertheless held to be a
joint author. See id. at 215. A later case that attempted to define the minimum contri-
bution necessary for one to be considered a joint author was Picture Music, Inc. v.
Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd on other grounds, 457 F.2d
1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972) (the "Three Little Pigs Case"). The
song Three Little Pigs was written for a Walt Disney movie, and Walt Disney owned
the copyright under the doctrine of work for hire. Later, Walt Disney assigned the
copyright to a company that developed an extended version of the song for release. Two
decades after the minor revisions required to lengthen the song, one of the composers
involved in the changes sued for a declaration of her part as joint author. See id. at
642-43. The court held that "a more substantial and significant contribution was re-
quired to reach a finding of joint ownership." Id. at 647.
122 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5736; see also Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 632-33 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding that a joint owner cannot infringe a coowner's copyright, but is
subject to a duty to account). Case law before the Act dealt similarily with the rights
and duties of joint owners. See Richmond v. Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 46 (9th Cir. 1965)
(holding that a joint owner of copyrights "could not and did not infringe such copy-
rights"); Donna v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 374 F. Supp. 429, 430-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(holding that a joint owner may license use of a work subject to a duty to account).
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the lyrics, the two create an interdependent joint work. If, however, in
the future, the composer of the music licenses a filmmaker to use only
the music in the film's soundtrack, the question arises whether the au-
thor of the lyrics is entitled to receive half of the royalties earned under
such an agreement. Even though the composers intended for the song to
be a joint, interdependent work at the time of creation, in reality, the
words and the music can be separated."2 3
This issue, though, should not arise very frequently, because the
work at creation was intended to be a joint work and its parts probably
will not be used separately. Furthermore, as the court in Edward B.
Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.'24 explained in dictum,
considering a song that is intended to be a joint work, "[tihe popularity
of a song turns upon both the words and the music; the share of each in
its success cannot be appraised; they interpenetrate each other as much
as the notes of the melody, or separate words of the 'lyric.' "125 There-
fore, the music in a song may be desirable as a movie soundtrack be-
cause of the popularity of the original song as a whole. The author of
the lyrics to the song should be as entitled as the composer to receive an
accounting of profits from the music.'26
2. Licensing of the joint work
As emphasized in most joint ownership cases, each author has the
right to license the work without the permission of other authors. 2
This right could cause problems between the joint authors if one author
approves of the licensing and the other does not. The common law ap-
proach of accounting for profits from the licensing solves one aspect of
this problem: at least the dissenting author can receive money from the
licensing arrangement. The other solution to this problem is a contract
between the coauthors at the time of creation of the work to restrict the
licensing right and require approval of all joint authors before the work
is licensed. Then, if one of the parties licenses the work without the
123 This problem may be the reason that many European countries do not give
joint authorship to interdependent works. See supra note 119.
124 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
125 Id. at 267.
126 Accounting of profits also works well in the computer software context. If the
flow charts are created by one party and the programming done by another party, with
both intending to create a joint work, the work would be an interdependent joint work.
Thus, if the flow chart creator wishes to license another programmer to program in
another language, even if the first programmer/joint author objected and could not
convince the flow chart creator to change her decision, the first programmer would still
receive half of the profits made from the flow charts' contribution to the new program.
12I See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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other's approval, the aggrieved party has a remedy for breach of
contract.
3. Termination of transfers
Under section 203 of the Act, an "author or, if the author is dead,
. . . the person or persons who. . . own and are entitled to exercise a
total of more than one-half of that author's termination interest"12
may terminate any transfer or licensing of copyrights between thirty-
five and forty years from the execution of the grant.129 The provision
further states that, if the work is a joint work, majority approval of the
termination by the authors, or the persons entitled to exercise their
rights, may terminate the transfer or license."' The right to terminate
is inalienable and cannot be forfeited through any agreement, including
an agreement to make a will. 31 The House Report claims that this
provision was included to "safeguard[] authors against unremunerative
transfers."' 32 In spite of these good intentions, however, this language
actually can work against the interests of the author. One commentator
makes clear the situations in which authors might wish for good rea-
sons to alienate the termination of transfer rights without making it
subject to her successors.' 3 However, this commentator also suggests a
method to circumvent these problems: create a joint tenancy between
the authors at the time of creation of the work. 34 Joint tenancy would
mean that any transfer is automatically only for a life estate. Unfortu-
nately, joint tenancy is not an option available to all joint authors, be-
cause a few states have abolished the right of survivorship.' 35
C. Applications of Joint Ownership
If the court had examined the possibilities of joint ownership in
128 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (1982).
129 See id. § 203(a)(3).
130 See id. § 203(a)(1).
131 See id. § 203(a)(5).
132 HousE REPORT, supra note 42, at 124, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 5740.
133 See See, Copyright Ownership ofJoint Works and Terminations of Transfers,
30 U. KAN. L. REv. 517, 526-28 (1982) (discussing situations in which the author has
more trust in the the coauthor to know what to do with the work than in the family
members; the author wishes to decrease the possibility of family arguments by placing
the termination interest in the hands of someone other than her successors; the author
wishes to give more freedom to the coauthor).
134 See id. at 528-31.
See id. at 529 & n.74 (citing Kentucky, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, and West Virginia as states that have abolished the right of
survivorship).
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Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,"3 6 it could have protected Al-
don from Spiegel's infringing actions without betraying the intent of the
Act's drafters. Ginsberg's contribution to the creation of the statuettes
satisfies the threshold requirements of joint ownership. As the court
said, "While he did not physically wield the sketching pen and sculpt-
ing tools, he stood over the artists and artisans at critical stages of the
process, telling them exactly what to do. He was, in a very real sense,
the artistic creator. ' 13 7 The artists who actually created the statuettes,
however, certainly contributed as well. Therefore, the level of contribu-
tion of the parties is sufficient to qualify for a joint work. 3 Because
the two parties collaborated on the creation of a single item, it seems
clear that they intended to create a joint work. Both parties must have
known that their work would be merged into a "unitary whole." Fi-
nally, with Japanese and Taiwanese artisans fleshing out Ginsberg's
ideas under Ginsberg's direction, separation of the individual contribu-
tions in this case would be impossible. Thus, Ginsberg and the artisans
created an inseparable joint work.
Because the statuettes qualify as joint works, Aldon would have
standing to sue Spiegel for infringement. Aldon would own the copy-
right to the porcelain statuettes as a tenant in common with the Japa-
nese manufacturing company and to the brass statuettes with the
Taiwanese company.' 39 Thus, Aldon still would receive the damages
awarded, subject to payment of the Japanese company's share.
Similarly, joint ownership offers a good solution for the dispute in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV)."4 ' Both parties
contributed substantially to the design of the statuette: CCNV contrib-
uted its ideas for the general appearance of the statue, and Reid con-
tributed his artistic talents in creating it."4 ' Because the contributions of
both parties to the work were indivisible, the work would qualify as an
136 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); see also supra
notes 47-62 and accompanying text (discussing Aldon and its implications).
13' Aldon, 738 F.2d at 553.
13 As the Fifth Circuit said in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children &
Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988): "What the court did not appear to bear in mind is that
any buyer satisfying a seriously enforced 'actual control' test will ordinarily be a co-
author of the work, entitled to bring and win an action for infringement against a third
party." Id. at 333.
139 Under United States law, as employers of the artists, the Japanese company
would jointly own the copyright of the porcelain statuettes and the Taiwanese company
would jointly own the copyright of the brass statuettes. Because Aldon was the em-
ployer of Ginsberg, Aldon would also own the joint copyright to the statuettes. See 17
U.S.C. § 101(1) (1982).
140 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
141 See id. at 1487-88.
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inseparable joint work. The parties worked in concert to create a single
work, so they obviously intended to create a joint work. Any dispute
over the statue's tour would be resolved contractually between the par-
ties, but no matter whose choice prevailed, both parties would receive
the profits. Therefore, both the nonprofit organization and the artist
would benefit from their collaboration. Joint ownership again provides
an equitable solution for the grey area of creative contribution causing
such difficulty with the work for hire doctrine.
IV. COMPUTER SOFTWARE AS WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND
JOINT WORKS
The difficulty in understanding the intricacies of programming in-
dicates the dangers of depending on a formula that grants software
copyright to only one party. The work for hire test proposed by the
Second Circuit requires just such a result. On the other hand, the Fifth
Circuit test for work for hire is flexible in its distribution of rights, thus
allowing for results that accurately reflect the parties' relationship. The
Easter Seal 42 test grants full copyright ownership through work for
hire to a commissioner only in a traditional employment relationship.
Otherwise, the independent contractor will own the work, the contrac-
tor will agree in writing to give the copyright ownership to the commis-
sioner, or the parties will own the work jointly. Considering computer
software in relation to work for hire and joint ownership shows the
benefits of such an objective test in comparison to the subjective Second
Circuit analysis.
BPI Systems, Inc. v. Leith'43 applied the work for hire doctrine to
a relationship between a software publisher and an independent con-
tractor. BPI hired Leith to produce twelve programs for an accounts
receivable system.' 4' Leith performed all the work at his place of busi-
ness and was paid by the program. 45 BPI contributed confidential doc-
uments and several copyrighted routines. 46 Later, Leith created a sys-
tem similar to the one he had sold to BPI and marketed it himself. BPI
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Leith from selling the new
programs or using the routines and confidential information. BPI
14I See Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy
Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).
143 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
144 See id. at 210.
145 See id.
146 See id. Because the routines contributed by plaintiff were created previously
for another work, joint ownership was not available as an option for the parties. See
supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (describing the intent required to create
joint works).
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claimed that the programs Leith had developed for BPI were works for
hire. 4  The court held that the commissioned programs were not works
for hire, because no written agreement between the parties existed to
show otherwise. 48 The court dismissed in one sentence the possibility
that Leith was a BPI employee.' 49 On the other hand, it did recognize
BPI's rights to the routines Leith had used and enjoined their further
use.
150
The Aldon approach would consider Leith controlled by, and
therefore an employee of, BPI, because BPI had the right to accept or
reject the programs Leith developed and because BPI contributed cer-
tain subroutines. Obviously, though, except for BPI's contribution of
the copyrighted routines and the idea for an accounts receivable system,
Leith did all the creative work.' 5' While BPI certainly should be able
to use the programs Leith created, Leith should own the rights to those
programs himself. Since Leith's fee only represented the value of a sin-
gle copy, he would have limited incentive to create the programs. He
could only afford to operate under these circumstances if he received his
value as a full-time employee. It is likely, however, that many compa-
nies commission programmers to write programs because they cannot
afford full-time employees to program for them. The programmers,
then, conceivably must sell multiple copies of their work in order to
receive the equivalent of a full-time wage. Under the Aldon decision
denying such remuneration, however, the creation of computer pro-
grams tailored to the needs of smaller companies would decrease, and
only large companies would be able to afford computerization. The Al-
don analysis quite possibly could slow the growth of small businesses
and make it more difficult for them to compete with large companies.
In Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software,'52 the com-
missioner did contribute creatively to the programming. Instead of al-
lowing Chicago Systems to share in the copyright ownership of the pro-
grams they helped to create, however, the court determined that Evans
Newton had made a certain minimum contribution to the project and
therefore owned all the rights. Thus, because the court failed to recog-
nize the creativity involved in the programming process, it denied copy-
right ownership to a major creative force in the program development.
The literal interpretation of work for hire theory in this instance
147 See BPI, 532 F. Supp. at 210.
148 See id.




152 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 U.S. 434 (1986).
[Vol. 137:1251
WORK FOR HIRE DILEMMA
would not have allowed Evans Newton .to hold the copyright to the
programs or manuals through work for hire. Chicago Systems defi-
nitely was not an employee of Evans Newton under agency law. 153 Sec-
ond, although the manuals could fall into one of the nine categories of
commissioned works, 5 there was no written agreement making them
works for hire. The programs would not fall into any of the commis-
sioned works categories, so the agreement recognizing Evans Newton's
rights to them would be irrelevant.
Joint ownership of the programs would have been the most equi-
table result in this case. The contributions by the parties were interde-
pendent. 55 The parties intended to create a joint work, even though
they created their portions at separate times."5 6 At the time of creation,
Chicago Systems and Evans Newton would have owned equal shares,
as tenants in common, of the computer system, but Chicago Systems
contractually agreed to transfer its rights in the programs to Evans
Newton. Evans Newton did not register the programs for copyright,
however, and so could not get relief for Chicago Systems' infringement.
The distribution of rights to the manual would be different, be-
cause the parties did not contractually address them. The manual was
probably a derivative work from the programs, because the manual is
dependent on the underlying program. 57 Chicago Systems would
153 See id. at 891 (stating that Chicago Systems was an independent contractor);
see also supra note 8 (providing the RESTATEMENT (AGENCY) definition of "servant").
154 See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). The manual probably would be a "supplementary
work" or an "instructional text." See id.
' The flow charts contributed by Evans Newton should be copyrightable as an
expression of the idea for educational programs. See supra notes 17-19 and accompany-
ing text. The programming done by Chicago Systems was certainly copyrightable. See
supra note 15 and accompanying text. Because the programming was dependent on the
flow charts, but the flow charts were capable of standing alone, the work would be an
interdependent work. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
15 In this instance, Evans Newton wrote the flow charts knowing that they would
be used to create programs for this specific computer system. See Evans Newton, 793
F.2d at 891. It then contracted with Chicago Systems to create the programs. See id.
Thus, the parties satisfied the requirements of co-authorship. Chicago Systems raised
the joint ownership option during the proceedings. The court dismissed it out-of-hand,
however, by saying the programs could not be jointly owned because they were works
for hire. See id. at 893.
The creation of this set of programs would be analogous to the creation of a song:
one party created the words and the other party created the music. As often occurs with
song-writing, one party writes the words knowing that someone else will set them to
music, or a party will write the music knowing that someone else will write the appro-
priate words. The parties must know at the time of creation of their portions only that
the portion will not stand alone and someone else will add to it. See supra notes 115-16
and accompanying text.
117 The manual is to the program what a film is to the novel it is based on. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1982). The court stated that Chicago Systems created the manual.
See Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 891.
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jointly own the underlying work, at least before the transfer of the pro-
gram's copyright, and wholly own the material independent of the pro-
gram required to create the manual. After the transfer of the program,
however, Chicago Systems would own only the part of the manual that
was new and independent of the program. Furthermore, Chicago Sys-
tems would only be able to use this with a license from Evans Newton,
the owner of the underlying work. Therefore, Chicago Systems would
infringe Evans Newton's potential copyright to the programs every time
it sold a manual. This infringement would make Chicago Systems lia-
ble to Evans Newton for damages if Evans Newton registered the pro-
gram for copyright protection.
If Chicago Systems transferred its share of the ownership of the
programs to Evans Newton and was liable to Evans Newton for profits
from the sale of a manual for a program it did not own, it would
hardly profit Chicago Systems to continue marketing this system.158
Therefore, the dispute between Evans Newton and Chicago Systems
would almost correct itself with a proper distribution of the ownership
shares in the programs and manual. Evans Newton would be reim-
bursed for its lost profits, and Chicago Systems would lose its incentive
to continue selling its version of the system. Although this solution does
not seem to change the outcome of the Evans Newton dilemma, it does
give Chicago Systems new rights. First, Chicago Systems would retain
the right to terminate its transfer of the programs. This right would be
very valuable, and should be available to Chicago Systems, considering
the circumstances under which the transfer was granted. Second, Chi-
cago Systems would own the rights to certain portions of the manual,
such as diagrams, that could be used in later works. Third, Chicago
Systems would not be discouraged from further programming, because
it would not have experienced any unexpected takings of its copyright.
Any rights Chicago Systems would lose would have been bargained
away. This solution, therefore, also is preferable because it does not
change the work for hire doctrine to reach an equitable solution for a
particular factual situation.
CONCLUSION
The analysis provided in this Comment reveals the faults of the
Aldon decision. Because Aldon requires investigation into employment
situations well outside traditional employer/employee relationships,
courts applying its doctrine must learn the trade practices of the specific
"I" This conclusion assumes that Evans Newton registers the programs for copy-
right protection.
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field in question. For a court to understand what "actual control" is, it
must evaluate the degree of control considered "creative" in the trade
practices of the community being examined. In the computer software
situation, failure to recognize creativity in the act of programming can
lead to a court's determination that programmers merely transcribe the
underlying flow charts.'59 Thus, a company believing itself an indepen-
dent contractor with proprietary interest in its work can suddenly be-
come an employee of its client and lose all its rights to the work.
Such a result could not happen using a literal interpretation of
work for hire doctrine, because this approach distinguishes between
employees and independent contractors and allows joint ownership to
play an increasing role in protecting creative contributions. If the party
in question is a traditional employee, the employer owns the work cre-
ated for it. If, however, the party in question is an independent contrac-
tor, the work must satisfy several legislative requirements before it can
become a work made for hire. Congress enacted these requirements
specifically to protect independent contractors from the unexpected loss
of their creative products. Furthermore, if the court determines joint
ownership to be appropriate, neither party will lose copyright owner-
ship. The Aldon decision and its progeny destroy the legislative intent
to encourage contracting and commissioning through the "carefully bal-
anced compromise" of the work for hire provision.' The literal work
for hire interpretation espoused by the Fifth, Ninth, and the D.C. Cir-
cuits is the only interpretation that produces equitable and predictable
results.
159 Similarly, a court's failure to recognize the creativity required to create a flow
chart could give full copyright ownership to a programmer.
I'l HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 5736.
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